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An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A
(H5N1) has recently spread to poultry in 9 Asian countries.
H5N1 infections have caused >52 human deaths in
Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia from January 2004 to
April 2005. Genomic analyses of H5N1 isolates from birds
and humans showed 2 distinct clades with a nonoverlapping
geographic distribution. All the viral genes were of avian
influenza origin, which indicates absence of reassortment
with human influenza viruses. All human H5N1 isolates test-
ed belonged to a single clade and were resistant to the
adamantane drugs but sensitive to neuraminidase
inhibitors. Most H5N1 isolates from humans were antigeni-
cally homogeneous and distinct from avian viruses circulat-
ing before the end of 2003. Some 2005 isolates showed
evidence of antigenic drift. An updated nonpathogenic H5N1
reference virus, lacking the polybasic cleavage site in the
hemagglutinin gene, was produced by reverse genetics in
anticipation of the possible need to vaccinate humans.
H
ighly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1
subtype are circulating in eastern Asia with unprece-
dented epizootic and epidemic effects (1). Nine Asian
countries reported H5N1 outbreaks in poultry in 2004:
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, South
Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam (1). Between 2004 and the
first 3 months of 2005, a total of 89 laboratory-confirmed
human infections, 52 of which were fatal, were reported to
the World Health Organization (WHO) by public health
authorities in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. These
records indicate that this outbreak of human H5N1 infec-
tions is the largest documented since its emergence in
humans in 1997 (2). Efficient viral transmission among
poultry caused the virus to spread regionally, leading to the
loss of >100 million birds from disease and culling. In con-
trast, human-to-human transmission of the virus is excep-
tional but has been described, most recently in a family
cluster in Thailand (3).
The 3 viral envelope proteins of influenza A virus are
most medically relevant. The hemagglutinin (HA), neu-
raminidase (NA), and M2 are essential viral proteins target-
ed by host antibodies or antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir
and rimantadine (4–6). The HA glycoprotein forms spikes
at the surface of virions, mediating attachment to host cell
sialoside receptors and subsequent entry by membrane
fusion. The NA forms knoblike structures on the surface of
virus particles and catalyzes their release from infected
cells, allowing virus spread. The M2 is a transmembrane
protein that forms an ion channel required for the uncoating
process that precedes viral gene expression.
We report on phylogenetic, phenotypic, and antigenic
analysis of H5N1 viruses from the 2004–2005 outbreak,
focusing on these 3 genes, to address questions relevant to
the public health response to the outbreak: 1) What is the
genetic diversity of H5N1 viruses involved in human infec-
tions? 2) Can the relationship between human and avian
H5N1 isolates help explain the source of infection? 3) Do
genetic changes correlate with enhanced viral transmissibil-
ity in humans? 4) How sensitive are H5N1 isolates to
antiviral drugs? 5) What is the antigenic similarity between
human H5N1 viruses and current candidate vaccines? and
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Methods
All work involving infectious H5N1 influenza was per-
formed in government-approved biosafety level
3–enhanced containment facilities with experimental pro-
tocols in compliance with applicable federal statutes and
institutional guidelines. Influenza A(H5N1) viruses isolat-
ed in Asia and A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (PR8) (H1N1) were
propagated in embryonated chicken eggs or in Madin-
Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. The African green
monkey kidney Vero cell line was from a cell bank certi-
fied for human vaccine production.
Viral RNA was extracted by using a commercial lysis
solution and resin kit and amplified by reverse transcrip-
tase–polymerase chain reaction with specific oligonu-
cleotide primers. Nucleotide sequencing reactions were
performed with a cycle sequencing kit and resolved on an
ABI 3100 Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystems, Foster
City, CA, USA). DNA sequence analysis was performed
by using version 10 of the GCG sequence analysis package
(7), and phylogeny was inferred by using a neighbor-join-
ing tree reconstruction method implemented in the Phylip
package (8).
Postinfection ferret antisera were prepared as previous-
ly described (9). Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) testing
was performed as previously described with turkey ery-
throcytes (10).
Median inhibitory concentration (IC50) values for
oseltamivir and zanamivir were determined by using NA-
Star substrate and Light Emission Accelerator IITM
(Applied Biosystems, Bedford, MA, USA) as previously
described (11). Biological susceptibility to rimantadine
was determined by recording the yield of viral progeny in
MDCK cells infected with the H5N1 strains of interest at
a multiplicity of >10 median egg infectious doses in the
absence or presence of 2 µg/mL rimantadine.
Plasmids with full-length cDNA from the 6 internal
genes (PB1, PB2, PA, NP, M, NS) of influenza virus PR8
strain (12), flanked by human RNA polymerase I (PolI)
promoter and polyadenylation site at the 3′ end and a PolI
terminator as well as a PolII promoter at the 5′ end, were
generated as described previously (12–14). The cDNA of
N1 NA or H5 HA genes of VN/1203/2004 or
VN/1194/2004 (VN/04-like) were inserted into plasmids
as described above. The 4 basic amino acid codons from
the cleavage site of HA were deleted by overlap extension
PCR, as described previously (sequences available upon
request) (13,15–17).
PR8 reassortant viruses with HA and NA from VN/04-
like viruses were generated by plasmid DNA-based
reverse genetics in Vero cell under good laboratory prac-
tice conditions appropriate for future human use.
Candidate vaccine reference reagent reassortant viruses
were generated at the National Institute of Biological
Standards and Control (NIBSC), South Mimms, United
Kingdom; Saint Jude Children’s Research Hospital
(SJCRH), Memphis, Tennessee, USA; and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia,
USA. For brevity, the reverse genetics derivation method
described represents a consensus of the institutions; minor
unpublished protocol details unique to each laboratory
were not described and are available upon request. The
VN/04x/PR8 reassortant virus was recovered in embry-
onated eggs and identified in the allantoic fluid by HA
assay. The genetic and antigenic properties of the resulting
reassortant virus were determined as described previously
(15,18–20). Candidate vaccine stocks were subjected to
virulence studies in avian, murine, and ferret models to
establish their safety (19).
Results
Analysis of HA, NA, and M2 Genes from H5N1 Viruses
Phylogenetic analyses of the H5 HA genes from the
2004 and 2005 outbreak showed 2 different lineages of HA
genes, termed clades 1 and 2. Viruses in each of these
clades are distributed in nonoverlapping geographic
regions of Asia (Figure 1). The H5N1 viruses from the
Indochina peninsula are tightly clustered within clade 1,
whereas H5N1 isolates from several surrounding countries
are distinct from clade 1 isolates and belong in the more
divergent clade 2. Clade 1 H5N1 viruses were isolated
from humans and birds in Vietnam, Thailand, and
Cambodia but only from birds in Laos and Malaysia. The
clade 2 viruses were found in viruses isolated exclusively
from birds in China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea.
Viruses isolated from birds and humans in Hong Kong in
2003 and 1997 made up clades 1′ and 3, respectively.
The HAgenes from H5N1 viruses isolated from human
specimens were closely related to HA genes from H5N1
viruses of avian origin; human HA gene sequences differ
from the nearest gene from avian isolates from the same
year in 2–14 nucleotides (<1% divergence). These findings
are consistent with the epidemiologic data that suggest that
humans acquired their infections by direct or indirect con-
tact with poultry or poultry products (21).
Analysis of the amino acid sequences showed that both
clades of H5 HAs from the 2004–2005 outbreak have a
multiple basic amino acid motif at the cleavage site, a
defining feature of highly pathogenic avian influenza
viruses. Among all H5N1 isolates collected in east Asia
since 1997, only those in clades 1, 1′, and 3 appear to be
associated with fatal human infections (22,23). We com-
pared amino acid sequences of HA from contemporary
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infections in Hong Kong in 1997 and 2003 to identify
changes that may correlate with patterns of human infec-
tion (Table 1). Thirteen polymorphic sites were identified
when the HA1 from the 4 consensus sequences were com-
pared. One change in the 2004–2005 viruses is serine 129
to leucine (S129L). This change affects receptor binding
because S129 makes atomic contact with cellular sialoside
receptors (24). A second structural change in HA was the
A156T substitution, which resulted in glycosylation of
asparagine 154 and is predicted to reduce its affinity for
sialosides. This change is commonly associated with viral
adaptation to terrestrial poultry and increased virulence for
these birds (25–27).
Because of the heightened alert due to H5N1 infections
in Vietnam during the first months of 2005, we examined
the HA sequences for evidence of shared amino acid
changes. The HA of viruses isolated in the first 3 months
of 2005 showed several amino acid changes relative to
2004 viruses (Table 1). None of the changes in the HA
were common to all the 2005 viruses, which suggests that
these variant viruses are cocirculating independently in
poultry. The most commonly observed changes are located
within short distances of the receptor-binding site. For
example, positions D94, L175, and T188 may modulate
the interaction of Y91, H179, and L190 with sialosides.
One of the isolates from a fatal infection in 2005 showed a
substitution of serine 223 to asparagine, which is predicted
to facilitate binding of sialosides commonly found in
mammalian species (Table 1).
The phylogenetic tree of the NA genes resembled that
of the HA genes, which indicates coevolution of these 2
envelope genes (Figure 2). NA genes of isolates from
Thailand seem to have diverged to form a group distinct
H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses in Asia
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Figure 1. Phylogenetic relationships among H5 hemagglutinin (HA) genes from H5N1 avian influenza viruses and their geographic dis-
tribution. Viral isolates collected before and during the 2004–2005 outbreak in Asia and selected ancestors were included in the analy-
sis (online Appendix Table, available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no10/05-0644_app2.htm). HA clades 1, 1′, and 2,
discussed in the text, are colored in blue, red, and green fonts, respectively. Virus names in boldface denote isolates from human infec-
tions. Phylogenetic trees were inferred from nucleotide sequences by the neighbor-joining method with A/chicken/Scotland/56 genes as
outgroup (not shown, denoted by arrowhead). Bootstrap analysis values >90% are shown. A) HA gene tree phylogeny was based on the
coding region of the segment. Presence of a motif for glycosylation in HA is indicated as A156T by an arrow at the root of clade 1 and a
diamond for other clades (Table 1). Stars denote absence of 1 arginine residue at the polybasic cleavage site, which starts at position
325 of HA1. Isolates to which ferret antisera were made for antigenic analyses are boxed (Table 2). B) Geographic distribution of H5N1
in east Asia: blue denotes countries reporting infections with clade 1 H5N1 in humans and birds (solid) or in birds only (hatched). Green
denotes countries reporting bird infections with clade 2 H5N1 viruses.from that of genes from Vietnam viruses. As reported
previously, the NA of HK/213/03 did not co-evolve with
the HA genes (28). NA genes from human and related
avian H5N1 isolates from 2003–2005 as well as clade 3
isolates were characterized by deletions in the stalk region
of the protein (positions 49–68 for clades 1–2 and 54–72
for clade 3) (29). Deletions in the stalk of the NA are
thought to increase retention of virions at the plasma mem-
brane (30) to balance weaker binding of sialic acid recep-
tors by the HA with newly acquired N154 glycosylation.
Neuraminidase inhibitors are effective antiviral drugs
against human influenza viruses, and preclinical studies
suggest a similar effectiveness against avian influenza in
humans (5,31). The IC50 of oseltamivir for the clade 1 and
2 NAof 2004–2005 isolates was <10 nmol/L, as compared
to IC50 values of 85 and 1,600 nmol/L for resistant H1N1
or H3N2 mutants used as controls (Table 3). Thus, NA of
H5N1 isolates is sensitive to this class of antiviral agents. 
The phylogenetic tree of the M genes resembled that of
the HA genes, indicating coevolution of these genes
(results not shown). The amino acid sequence of the M2
protein of clade 1 viruses as well as of HK/213/03 indicat-
ed a serine-to-asparagine substitution at residue 31
(S31N), known to confer resistance to adamantanes
(including amantadine and rimantadine) (6). Clade 1 iso-
lates from 2004 and 2005 cultured in the presence of 2
µg/mL rimantadine replicated as efficiently as in untreated
cultures, whereas the replication of HK/483/97 was
reduced to 1% of control values, indicating that all the cur-
rently circulating clade 1 isolates are resistant to adaman-
tanes (data not shown).
Origin of Internal Genes of H5N1 Viruses from Asia
Acomplete genetic characterization of circulating H5N1
viruses is critical to identify the possible incorporation of
human influenza virus genes by reassortment. To this end,
we analyzed the phylogeny of the internal protein coding
genes. The PB2, PB1, and PA polymerase genes from
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clade (data not shown) and have coevolved with the respec-
tive HAgenes (Figure 1). No evidence of reassortment with
polymerase genes from circulating H1N1 or H3N2 human
influenza virus was found. The phylogenies of the NP and
NS genes also supported the avian origin of these genes,
indicating that all the genes from the human H5N1 isolates
analyzed are of avian origin, which confirms the absence of
reassortment with human influenza genes. Taken together,
the phylogenies of the 8 genomic segments show that the
H5N1 viruses from human infections and the closely relat-
ed avian viruses isolated in 2004 and 2005 belong to a sin-
gle genotype, often referred to as genotype Z (1).
Antigenic Analysis of H5N1 Viruses from Asia
Influenza vaccines whose HA are antigenically similar
to circulating strains provide the highest level of protection
from infection (32). H5N1 isolates collected in 2004 and
2005 analyzed by the HI test showed reactivity patterns
that correlated with the 3 main clades of recent isolates
identified in the HA gene phylogeny (Table 2 and Figure
1). Viruses from humans and birds in clade 1, represented
by VN/1203/04, were found to constitute a relatively
homogeneous and distinct antigenic group characterized
by poor inhibition by ferret antisera to isolates from other
clades (Table 2), in particular by the ferret antiserum raised
to HK/213/03 (64-fold reduction compared to the homolo-
gous titer). The latter isolate was previously used to devel-
op a vaccine reference strain in response to 2 confirmed
H5N1 human infections in February 2003 (15). These HI
results provided the motivation for the development of an
updated H5N1 vaccine that would be antigenically similar
to 2004–2005 human isolates. The antigenic similarity of
VN/1203/04 and the closely related VN/1194/04 to the
contemporaneous H5N1 isolates from humans (data not
shown) prompted their selection for vaccine reference
stock development.
Antigenic analysis of human isolates from 2005 provid-
ed evidence of antigenic drift among the most recently cir-
culating H5N1 strains (Table 2). For example,
VN/JPHN30321/05 showed a reduced HI titer against
VN/1203/04 reference serum. This antigenic difference is
correlated with 7 amino acid differences between the HA1
domain VN/1203/04 and VN/JPHN30321/05: R53K,
N84D, D94N, K140R, L175M, K189R, and V219I (Table
1 and online Appendix Table).
Development of Candidate H5N1 Vaccine 
Reference Stocks
Mass vaccination is the most effective approach to
reduce illness and death from pandemic influenza.
Inactivated influenza vaccines are manufactured from reas-
sortant viruses obtained by transferring the HA and NA
genes with the desired antigenic properties into a high-
growth strain such as PR8 (33). However, reassortants with
H5-derived HAwith a polybasic cleavage site are potential-
ly hazardous for animal health. Because the high patho-
genicity of the H5N1 viruses in poultry, mice, and ferrets
depends primarily on the polybasic cleavage site in the HA
molecule, a derivative with a deletion of this motif was
engineered in cloned HA cDNAs. Three high-growth reas-
sortant influenza viruses were developed: NIBRG-14
(NIBSC), VN/04xPR8-rg (SJCRH), and VNH5N1-
PR8/CDC-rg (CDC). These candidate vaccine strains, bear-
ing mutant H5 HA, intact NA, and the internal genes from
PR8, were generated by a reverse genetics approach
(12,13,20,34) using Vero cells and laboratory protocols
compatible with eventual use of the vaccine in human sub-
jects (15,18). These 3 vaccine candidates were character-
ized genetically (nucleotide sequencing of HAand NA) and
antigenically in HI assays to confirm that their antigenicity
remained unchanged relative to the wildtype virus (Table
2). The candidate reference stocks had molecular and anti-
genic properties equivalent to parental H5N1 donor strains
and lacked virulence in chicken, mouse, and ferret models.
Discussion
The growing H5N1 epizootic in eastern Asia could
expand the environmental load of virus and cause more
H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses in Asia
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic relationships among N1 neuraminidase
(NA) genes of H5N1 influenza viruses. The clade of the hemagglu-
tinin of each of these viruses is indicated by font coloring as in
Figure 1A. Brackets denote genes encoding NA protein with dele-
tions in the stalk region; residues 49–68 for clades 1–2 and 57–75
in clade 3.infections in mammals (35), which would increase the
probability that a highly transmissible virus will emerge in
mammals. We therefore analyzed the medically relevant
genes from viruses isolated from the beginning of the out-
break until March 2005 to evaluate parameters relevant to
public health.
The origin of the HA genes of the 2004–2005 outbreak
as well as an earlier isolate from a fatal human infection in
Hong Kong in 2003 (clade 1′) can be traced back to virus-
es isolated in 1997 in Hong Kong (clade 3) and from geese
in China (goose/Guangdong/96) (Figure 1A). The phy-
logeny also shows that viruses with HK/97-like HA may
have circulated in avian hosts continuously after 1997,
without causing any reported human infections until the 2
confirmed cases in Hong Kong in February 2003 (28).
The 2004–2005 H5N1 isolates are sensitive to 2 neu-
raminidase inhibitors that are recommended for prophylac-
tic or therapeutic intervention against human infections
with recent H5N1 strains. Rapidly testing potentially pan-
demic influenza viruses for their susceptibility to licensed
drugs is essential to establish appropriate control measures.
An effective H5N1 vaccine is a public health priority
and the cornerstone for pandemic prevention and control.
Reverse genetics approaches allow the rapid production of
high-growth PR8 reassortant viruses by engineering a
virus with a homologous HA gene lacking the polybasic
amino acids associated with high virulence. These candi-
date H5N1 pandemic vaccine viruses have been made
available to vaccine manufacturers to produce pilot lots for
clinical trials and are available for possible large-scale
manufacturing should the need arise.
Genetic and antigenic analyses have shown that, com-
pared to previous H5N1 isolates, 2004–2005 isolates share
several amino acid changes that modulate antigenicity and
perhaps other biological functions. Furthermore, our
molecular analysis of the HA from isolates collected in
2005 suggests that several amino acids located near the
receptor-binding site are undergoing change, some of
which may affect antigenicity or transmissibility. For
example, an isolate (VN/JP12-2/05) showed a change from
serine to asparagine at position 223 of the HA1 (S223N)
that may affect receptor-binding specificity (36). The
VN/30321/05 isolate demonstrated considerable antigenic
drift from VN/04-like isolates, which have been selected
as the candidate vaccine antigens. Further surveillance to
determine the prevalence of such variants in poultry will
be critical to determine if these variants compromise the
efficacy of the candidate vaccine or increase the efficiency
of transmission.
The phylogenies of the 8 genomic segments from the
clade 1 and 2 isolates from 2004–2005 showed that all
genes are of avian origin. All H5N1 isolates from both
clades belong to 1 of the genotypes recently circulating in
Eastern and Southern Asia, e.g., genotypes V and Z (1,37).
The influenza virus genome has remarkable plasticity
because of a high mutation rate and its segmentation into 8
separate RNA molecules. This segmentation allows fre-
quent genetic exchange by segment reassortment in hosts
co-infected with 2 different influenza viruses. No evidence
has been seen that the 2004–2005 H5N1 isolates have
acquired nonavian influenza genes by reassortment.
However, continued surveillance is important because
genetic reassortment may facilitate the evolution of virus-
es with increased virulence or expanded host range.
The currently circulating H5N1 viruses were reported
to infect domestic or wild captive felids, such as tigers,
feeding on infected bird carcasses, and the infected cats
can transmit H5N1 to pen mates (38). Furthermore, cir-
cumstantial evidence indicates that tiger-to-tiger transmis-
sion of H5N1 has occurred at a zoo in Thailand (39).
Recent evidence of person-to-person transmission and the
clustering of H5N1 cases raise the level of concern for a
pandemic of H5N1 influenza (3). Therefore, sustained and
aggressive efforts to control H5N1 circulation in poultry
are mandatory to avoid possible catastrophic public health
consequences.
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